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''Time and Eternity - An Essay on the Philosophy of Religion'' (1st imp. Princeton New Jersey 1952, Princeton University Press, 169 pp) is a philosophy book written by Walter Terence Stace. At the time of writing, Stace was a professor of philosophy at Princeton University, where he had worked since 1932 after a 22 year career in the Ceylon Civil Service. ''Time and Eternity'' was one of his first books about the philosophy of religion and mysticism, after writing throughout most of the 1930s and 1940s that was influenced by phenomenalist philosophy. In his introduction Stace writes that ''Time and Eternity'' is an attempt to set out the fundamental nature of religion, and to deal with the conflict between religion and naturalism. He explains that the basic idea set out in the book is that all religious thought is symbolic, and that his influences include Rudolf Otto, especially his ''Mysticism East and West'', and Immanuel Kant. He says he was motivated to write the book in an attempt to add to the "other half of the truth which I now think naturalism (espoused in his 1947 essay ''Man Against Darkness'' ) misses". The book begins by looking at religion, specifically God as non-being and as being, put by Stace as the negative and positive divine. Stace then defines two orders of being - time and eternity, which he says intersect in the moment of mystic illumination. He goes on to say that the nature of God or eternity is such that all religious language is symbolic and that it is necessarily subject to contradictions. ==Synopsis== The first chapter asks what religion is, stating that religious thought is contradictory, is rooted in intuition, and that God is fundamentally a mystery. The second and third chapters look at the negative divine - the characterisation of God as void, silence or non-being - which Stace maintains is an idea found in all religions. He maintains that mystical experience is shared by all mankind, it is only the theories about it that differ.〔Stace, W. T. (1952) ''Time and Eternity''. Princeton University Press. P. 22.〕 On this point he says he is in agreement with Otto. In this experience the distinction between subject and object is overcome, indeed there is no difference between the experiencer and the experience. Stace then goes on to explain that all religions say that religious revelation is ineffable, because no words or concepts can be applied to God who is without qualities or predicates. Thus, God cannot be comprehended by the intellect, but is apprehended by intuition. "... it is of the very nature of intellect to involve the subject-object opposition. But in the mystic experience this opposition is transcended. Therefore the intellect is incapable of understanding it. Therefore it is incomprehensible, ineffable."〔Stace (1952) P. 40〕 Stace then looks at the positive divine; he asks how concepts can be applied to that which is above all concepts and finds that all propositions about God are symbolical. He defines religious and non-religious symbolism as differing in two respects. Firstly, religious symbols cannot be translated into logical propositions because they refer to an (ineffable) experience rather than a proposition. Secondly, the relationship between the religious symbol and what is symbolised is one of evocation rather than "meaning", as meaning refers to a concept, which is absent in the mystical experience. "Yet in some way this symbolic language evokes in us some glimpse, some hint, seen dimly through the mists and fogs which envelop us, of that being who stands above all human thought and conception."〔Stace (1952) P. 51〕 He goes on to write that some of these symbols feel more appropriate than others (e.g. God is love not hate). Next Stace explains that there are two orders of being: time (or the world) and eternity (or God), and these intersect in the moment of mystic illumination. He maintains these orders are distinct, so one order cannot dictate to the other. Here he says that he agrees with Kant, who made a distinction between the world of phenomena and the noumenon, although he is critical of Kant’s disregard for mystical experience.〔Stace (1952) P. 148〕 Looking at symbolism in religion, Stace states that there are two types of predicates applied to God: first, the ethically-neutral sort, such as God being mind, power or personhood. Secondly, the ethical kind, where he is love, mercy, or righteousness. He explains that the former qualities are justified by an appeal to a hierarchy of being, and the latter to a hierarchy of value. In both cases the more adequate symbol are those that are higher in each hierarchy. In rooting symbolism in hierarchies, Stace explicitly states he is in opposition to Otto who thought religious symbolism was based on analogy between the numen and qualities found in the natural world.〔Stace (1952) P. 94-95〕 Stace next looks at religion’s claims to truth. He draws an analogy between mystical illumination and aesthetic truth, as the truths of both rest on revelation rather than reason. "Either you directly perceive beauty, or you do not. And either you directly perceive God in intuition, or you do not."〔Stace (1952) P. 142〕 Further, he maintains the arguments of both mystics and naturalists in denying each other’s positions are invalid, as they concern different realities. These separate spheres lead Stace to reflect on both proofs for God and acosmism. He writes that proofs and disproofs for God are equally false, as God is only accessible by intuition and not logic. "… the production by philosophers of proofs of the unreality of space, time, and the temporal world generally, is a direct result of their mistaking of their mystical propositions for factual propositions." 〔Stace (1952) P. 134〕 Further, proofs of God actually harm religion as they make him a part of the natural order - a point on which he says that he agrees with Kant.〔Stace (1952) P. 147-8〕 Conversely acosmism (the denial of the reality of the world) has its root in the mystical moment, within which there is no other truth, God is the supreme reality and there is no naturalistic world. However this is a symbolic truth, rather than a statement of fact. Its counterpart in naturalism is atheism, which denies the reality of God. In the final chapter Stace looks at mysticism and logic. He returns to the idea that theology and mystical philosophies (he gives the examples of Vedanta, Spinoza, Hegel, and Bradley) will always contain contradictions. Known as the doctrine of the Mystery of God, he maintains this is because the intellect is inherently incapable of understanding the Ultimate. All attempts to state the nature of the ultimate necessarily produce contradictions. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Time and Eternity (philosophy book)」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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